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Abstract 
The UK gas industry has undergone major changes since it was privatised in 1986 as a fully 
integrated monopoly. The most significant of these has occurred not as a result of the privatisation 
legislation but by the intervention of the ordinary competition authorities in support of an active 
industry regulator. While price capping continues to be used as the primary instrument for welfare 
protection against the still substantial monopolistic powers of the incumbent, new competition 
(which has been positively encouraged) has had the greater impact on prices and choice. Recently, 
however, the regulator has encouraged the use of auctions for the sale of storage capacity. This 
paper considers the merits of auctions and makes a tentative evaluation of their effectiveness. 
Further use of auctions is recommended but reserve prices are considered inappropriate where 
monopoly power still remains. 
JEL classification: L51, L95, L97. 
I. THE UK GAS MARKET 
The UK gas industry is of interest for two main reasons. In the first place, it 
provides a large share of total UK energy supplies.
1 It is the largest supplier to 
the domestic or household market, where gas is used mainly for space heating 
and cooking; and it occupies an important role both in the industrial market and 
increasingly in the power-station market as a source of relatively low-pollution 
                                                                                                                                    
*Department of Economics, University of Surrey. 
1Thirty-six per cent of total inland energy consumption of primary fuels in 1996. The others are petroleum (34 
per cent), coal (19.9 per cent) and nuclear electricity (9.5 per cent). See Department of Trade and Industry 
(1998). Fiscal Studies 
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fuel. However, it is significant too in the changes that have taken place in its 
ownership and organisation in the post-war period. Originally based on coal, the 
industry remained small-scale and locally based until 1949, when it was 
nationalised in a similar manner to other industries in the fuel sector. It remained 
under state ownership until 1986, when the Gas Act returned it to the private 
sector as a privatised monopoly supplier — British Gas plc (BG). 
The subsequent history of the privatised industry has been well described as 
‘an excellent case study of the problem of regulating and restructuring a 
dominant, vertically integrated firm’ (Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers, 1994). 
Good reviews of the main developments include: Armstrong et al.’s own 
comprehensive analysis of the period up to 1994 covering the Gas Act 1986; 
early investigations of the industry by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
(MMC) in 1988 and 1993 and the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in 1991; and a 
useful chapter in Newbery (1999). Yarrow (1998) discusses the extension of 
competition in gas markets and the development by Transco
2 of the network 
code governing competition in transportation. He argues that it has been the 
defining of rules of competition, rather than structural changes in themselves, 
that has transformed the industry, and he draws attention to the anti-competitive 
nature of the network code. Waddams Price (1998) highlights the difficulties of 
extending effective choice to smaller consumers and the potential for erecting 
barriers to entry when the incumbent exaggerates costs of supplying smaller 
customers, and argues for a greater focus on distributional issues. Davis and 
Flanders (1995), taking a different tack, examine the inconsistencies in 
regulation and point to the costs of loss of genuine economies of scale by 
changes in the market position of British Gas. A study of the 1993 MMC report 
by Robinson (1994) is valuable for its explanation of the influential role of the 
Gas Council, the forerunner of British Gas, as collector of North Sea gas field 
rents for the government, which accounted for its monopsonistic behaviour 
towards gas producers, its lack of incentive towards efficiency and its influence 
on government ministers. Its strong bargaining position enabled BG in 1986 to 
emerge from the privatisation process as a vertically integrated monopoly 
supported by protected markets and long-term supply contracts. 
Despite their differences of approach, the earlier commentators agree on three 
points: 
•  Privatisation of the gas industry in 1986 did little to promote customer 
welfare directly by lowering prices or increasing output availability. 
•  Initiatives by the ordinary competition authorities (the MMC and the OFT) in 
support of the industry regulator were nevertheless successful in limiting the 
market power of British Gas and in extending competition to industrial and 
                                                                                                                                    
2Transco was the pipeline arm of BG plc. It is now part of Lattice Group, which demerged from BG in October 
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domestic markets. The benefits of competition have been outstanding, both in 
terms of new market entry and in terms of benefits to customers. 
•  BG, rather than being broken up, has survived remarkably well as a group of 
separated but not divested companies under common ownership, and it 
retains significant market power in some markets, notably transportation and 
storage.  
This paper focuses on recent efforts by the industry regulator to stimulate 
competition further in the industry by the use of auctions, and in particular 
examines the gas storage auction of March–April 1999. Auctions have had a 
chequered history in the gas industry. Although they were advocated by Kenneth 
Dam and Colin Robinson as far back as 1976 (Robinson, 1994), as a way of 
allocating North Sea gas exploration and production licences, auctions were 
rejected by a government preferring a more discretionary and interventionist 
approach to licence awards (for example, preferring domestic over foreign oil 
companies). Yet auctions had been extensively used in the US for oil leases, and 
a literature discussing their efficiency properties had been available since 1971 
(Klemperer, 1999). Academic discussion of auction issues flourished during the 
1980s, when many fundamental features of auctions including the influence of 
auction design (first price, second price and so on) and assumptions about 
independence or common values were thoroughly explored. However, it is not 
until quite recently that auctions have come to be accepted as an effective means 
of attaining social objectives within regulated industries. The success of auctions 
in raising public funds both in the US (particularly in the case of the radio 
spectrum auctions, on which see McAfee and McMillan (1996)) and in the UK’s 
own sale of privatised assets has encouraged their use in areas previously 
thought unsuitable, such as gas storage. The next section discusses the nature of 
gas storage and the potential for enhanced performance through improved 
markets. 
II. THE ROLE OF STORAGE IN THE UK GAS MARKET 
The ability to use storage economically has long been recognised as an important 
difference between the gas and electricity industries (Bates and Fraser, 1974, p. 
138). Storage enables better co-ordination between supply and demand so that a 
constant supply can be better fitted to a varying demand — for example, in peak 
times. According to Rees (1984, p. 113), 
storage permits a higher level of consumer benefit ... not only because it permits utilisation 
of off-peak capacity which might otherwise lie idle, but also because it enables a degree of 
arbitrage, transferring consumption from the period in which its value is low to that in 
which it is higher, to an extent determined by the costs of storage. Fiscal Studies 
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In addition, storage has a function in coping with stochastic events and is 
valuable in improving the safety of a system.
3 Storage enables a gas system to 
cope with two recurring problems — diurnal (daily) demand swings and seasonal 
variations in demand (Ofgas, 1997, 1998, 1999a, 1999b and 1999c).  
It is perhaps helpful in understanding the role of storage to consider the short-
run supply choices available whenever customers increase their demand for gas 
at a particular location. The supplier may: 
•  increase compression to overcome the pressure drop;
4 
•  raise operating pressure by increasing offtake from a terminal near the source 
of demand (swing supply); 
•  extract gas from storage with a similar effect on operating pressure; or 
•  reduce demand elsewhere by shutting off interruptible customers. 
Being able to juggle between these options provides several economies to an 
integrated supplier. These are: 
•  Diversity benefits whereby individual users’ peak demands and supplies are 
offset against each other to produce a smoother load profile. The system peak 
demand is less than the sum of the peak demands of all customers. 
•  Increased security of supplies in case of interruptions or failure of 
components of the transport system. Alternative routes through the 
transmission network are available in an emergency. This is rather like the 
security provided by the Internet to computer users. 
•  Information economies resulting from integrated customer relations (one 
telephone call for anything). The gas transportation system responds to 
signals arising from pressure changes at various nodes and does not require 
information on every customer.  
Why should the provision of storage be regulated? There are two potential 
welfare-reducing consequences of underprovision of storage — higher peak/off-
peak pricing differentials, and overinvestment in production and transmission 
facilities. Customers with high winter demand relative to annual usage are worst 
affected because of their high relative needs for capacity investment. In addition, 
storage can provide competitive firms with a means of reducing the costs of 
balancing peak/off-peak requirements and so help to attract entry to the industry. 
                                                                                                                                    
3Bates and Fraser (1974) mention three functions of storage — co-ordination, regulation and safety. We have 
grouped the first two together under co-ordination. 
4This follows from an engineering equation determining flows of gas through a pipeline, 
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αα α +− =− , where D is pipeline diameter,  1 P  is inlet pressure,  0 P  is outlet pressure, L is pipeline 
length, and k and α  are empirically determined parameters. The difference in inlet and outlet pressures 
occasioned by an increase in demand is overcome by compression using gas turbines or new supplies (see 
Banks (1987)). The UK Gas Market 
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How would unrestricted access to storage help to reduce costs? Suppose the 
amount of storage demanded were less than the amount available in the short 
run. Then marginal storage costs would set an upper bound to peak day costs. 
Peak costs would not exceed the sum of marginal production plus transportation 
costs and marginal storage costs. On the other hand, if the demand for storage 
exceeds the availability of storage, the price of storage will rise. Since storage is 
now more expensive, production will shift away from the off-peak towards the 
peak period, where output is more valued. Storage moderates the change in peak 
prices that would otherwise need to be made to achieve the same effect. The 
introduction of competition into the provision of storage services will improve 
consumer welfare if it brings down storage costs. 
Since storage is so closely related to the needs of the entire transportation 
system for gas, would it not be better to leave it integrated with transportation? 
Certain uses of storage are indeed complementary to transportation. These 
include: the provision of operating margins for safely running the system in the 
event of equipment failure or weather changes; ‘top-up’ gas for meeting demand 
when beach supplies
5 are inadequate in extreme weather; balancing margins for 
coping with temporary problems in the working of the flexibility mechanism; 
and diurnal storage to cover daily variations in demand. But storage is not the 
only way of meeting these requirements — for example, interruptible sales can 
be reduced in extreme weather, and beach swing provides some flexibility during 
off-peak periods in particular. The existence of these alternative sources 
provides the basis for the claim that storage functions in a potentially 
competitive market and that competition can have efficiency benefits for users of 
these services. In addition, even within the storage sector proper, facilities differ 
widely in their capacities for storing and releasing gas. Where storage facilities 
are not homogeneous, competition will allow comparative advantages to be 
discovered so that an efficient mix of provision is made. 
In the UK, diurnal local storage is provided by British Gas in the form of low-
pressure gasholders, linepack and high-pressure storage plant. Large-scale 
national facilities (Table 1) consist of a former gas field (Rough), salt cavities at 
Hornsea and five liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities. They differ in terms of 
storage capacity and injection and withdrawal rates, and so are suitable for 
different purposes. Rough, with its large capacity but slow withdrawal rates, is 
suitable for seasonal storage; Hornsea is smaller but has faster input/output rates; 
and the LNG sites have the most rapid rates of deliverability and are suitable for 
short periods of high demand. 
                                                                                                                                    
5Gas delivered to beach terminals from offshore gas fields by producers. Fiscal Studies 
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TABLE 1 




(% of peak gas at beach) 
Injection 
(GWh/day) 
Rough gas field  30,344  455 (8.8%)  160.0 
Hornsea salt cavity  3,495  188 (3.6%)  21.4 
      
LNG sites      
Avonmouth 827  165  (3.2%)  2.6 
Dynevor Arms  276  55 (1.1%)  2.9 
Glenmavis 827  165  (3.2%)  2.5 
Isle of Grain  1,213  243 (4.7%)  5.4 
Partington 1,195  239  (4.6%)  5.2 
      
Peak beach flows    5,191  
Source: Ofgas, 1998, p. 14. 
 
1. Regulatory Control of Storage 
Although the Gas Act 1986 did not provide specifically for the licensing of 
storage as a separate activity, a storage provider needed a public gas transporter 
licence to convey gas through pipes. Between 1990 and April 1997, storage was 
subject to the same price-cap control as transportation. Then, in April 1997, 
storage and transportation were unbundled and a separate price control applied 
to each. New opportunities for competition, both between storage facilities and 
with European gas via the interconnector with Belgium, opened up in 1998.  
2. The 1993 MMC Report 
Dissatisfaction with BG’s failure to implement a commitment to the OFT to 
separate its transportation and storage business led the Director General of Gas 
Supply (DGGS) to refer the matter to the MMC in 1993. In its evidence to the 
MMC, British Gas argued for an integrated transportation and storage system. 
BG divided customers into core customers — largely weather-sensitive — and 
domestic customers — for whom safety was such a priority that provision of 
choice would be costly and unnecessary. Core customers also faced the risk of 
shipper default. They would therefore benefit from a common level of security. 
Above this level, customers could bear the risks themselves. However, because 
BG judged that this cut-off level was at 100,000 therms, a mere 9,000 sites were 
left for independent shippers to supply. The MMC considered that, ultimately, 
the argument was about BG’s capacity to curtail consumption by defaulting 
shippers. The implication for storage was that almost all Rough, Hornsea and 
LNG storage capacity would be reserved for core users.  
The consequences of such an approach were seen by the MMC to be: The UK Gas Market 
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•  stifling the development of a competitive market in storage supplies; 
•  that BG rather than the shipper bears the risks of inadequate storage; 
•  strict controls on non-core users. 
Another issue was the bundled services that BG preferred to sell at fixed 
prices to shippers. These bundles offered different amounts of peak and seasonal 
storage. Shippers would have no operational control of, for example, the location 
of the storage they obtained — that would remain in the hands of BG, which 
would run it in such a way as to maximise system efficiency. Contracts would 
govern such matters as peak day withdrawal, injection and storage entitlements 
and would be enforced by penalty charges.  
BG was criticised by the Office of Gas Supply (Ofgas) for not allowing 
customers to choose the level of gas service they wanted or shippers to choose 
between different ways of meeting customer demand. Since neither the customer 
nor the shipper determined the provision of supply, the development of 
competition was hindered. Next, discrimination in favour of the trading arm of 
BG — BG Trading & Supply (BG T&S) — was possible, erecting barriers to 
entry by setting excessively costly requirements for competitors. The MMC 
considered that, under the proposals, BG T&S would have a monopoly position 
in the supply of gas transportation, balancing and storage. 
Following the publication of the 1993 MMC report, a number of significant 
changes occurred in the structure of the industry. Although the MMC had 
recommended divestment, the government decided in December 1993 merely to 
separate transportation and storage. In 1995, a new Gas Act implemented 
competition in domestic sales on a rapid timetable. Then, in August 1996, the 
DGGS recommended separate price caps for storage and transportation, and also 
a reduction in transport charges of 20 per cent in real terms and a reduction in 
investment. BG rejected the proposal, and the matter was referred back to the 
MMC in October 1996. Between the referral and the report (May 1997), BG 
demerged into Transco (transportation and storage) and Centrica (trading and 
some production).  
The MMC report approved the need for separation of storage from 
transportation and suggested that separate price caps would be a first step in 
unbundling the services. Under the DGGS’s proposals, separate price caps were 
set for storage and transport.  
3. The 1997 MMC Report 
The DGGS’s proposals included separate price caps for storage and 
transportation, and an initial substantial reduction in Transco’s charges (20 per 
cent) followed by a more stringent X-efficiency control. A clear distinction was 
made between storage, which was potentially competitive, and transportation, 
which was not. Potential competitors had indicated their desire to build Fiscal Studies 
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competing storage facilities (Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1997, p. 13). 
The main problem with the current price control was that it allowed Transco to 
compensate any loss of revenue from storage competition with higher revenues 
from transportation. The MMC judged that this would be likely to operate 
against the public interest. BG had argued that the effect of unbundling storage 
would be a loss in the value of its assets and demanded compensation for 
stranded assets. Its case was rejected rightly by both the Director General and the 
MMC on grounds that asset values may rise as well as fall post-unbundling and, 
if asset values rose, the problem would disappear.  
BG had applied to disapply price control from storage. The MMC ruled that 
some form of regulation, at least in the short term, was necessary because of 
BG’s market power at peak periods when there was as yet no effective 
alternative supplier of storage. A compromise was reached whereby the control 
would be reviewed after three years.  
Separate price controls for transportation and for storage were implemented 
in 1997. At this point, however, serious discussions were held on the potential 
use of auctions to replace the existing price-cap regulation for at least part of 
storage. The next section considers the general arguments in favour of auctions, 
while Section IV relates them to gas storage.  
III. AUCTIONS AND THEIR USES 
Auctions are stylised markets with well-defined rules which can be used to raise 
revenue quickly. In addition, they have several informational advantages. They 
can be used by sellers to extract information from buyers as to their valuation of 
goods. Auctions are allocatively efficient in that, if the bids reflect the true 
valuation of the bidders and the item is sold to the bidder with the highest 
valuation, then the welfare gain from the transaction is maximised. Thus for 
goods with unknown or highly uncertain value, such as works of art or indeed 
gas storage in a changed market structure, an auction may be an efficient way of 
valuing and allocating the good. Whether this happens in practice depends upon 
the nature of information held by the bidders, the type of auction carried out and 
the degree of collusion possible either between bidders or between sellers/ 
auctioneer and bidders.  
Where the value of the item is truly unknown, so that each bidder has an 
independent valuation, it can be shown (Klemperer, 1999) that the standard types 
of auctions are ‘revenue-equivalent’ or yield the same expected revenues from 
the winning bid. This applies to the so-called English auction, where the highest 
bidder wins the object and pays their bid, to the Dutch auction, in which the 
price is lowered successively until the first bidder appears, as well as to first 
price sealed bid auctions and to Vickrey-type auctions (after Vickrey (1961)), 
which are second price sealed bid auctions where the winner pays the amount of The UK Gas Market 
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the second-highest bid. These auctions are also Pareto-optimal in the sense that 
the prize is expected to end up in the hands of those who value it most.  
In practice, implementation of auctions is likely to be affected by two main 
problems. In the first place, there may be a true but unknown value for the item. 
This may be a more accurate representation of commodities such as gas or oil 
that are used as inputs in the production of market goods. The existence of a 
common but unknown value can produce the so-called ‘winner’s curse’ in 
common value auctions. This is because, given any distribution of values, the 
winner will also have the most optimistic valuations. ‘Anyone who wins against 
experts should worry about why they all bid less’ (Rasmusen, 1994, p. 300). 
Historically, the winner’s curse has been blamed for poor performance of US oil 
tracts bid for in the 1960s (see Clapen, Clapp and Campbell (1971)). To some 
extent, the problem can be avoided by each bidder revising their bid downward 
by an amount y, where y is the difference between their valuation conditional 
upon their winning and losing the auction. Sellers can raise the general level of 
bids by disclosing all relevant information; this reduces bidder uncertainty and 
mitigates the winner’s curse. 
The second problem, known as the hold-up problem, can arise when quasi-
rents exist following the implementation of a contract. This might be because a 
buyer sinks some costs after the auction — for example, by locating near a 
specific storage site. Where sunk costs are made, the seller has an incentive to 
exploit their power by attempting to raise prices ex post, by renegotiating the 
contract. This increases the cost of the whole operation and may deter buyers. If 
buyers factor in the ex-post renegotiation cost, they are likely to offer less at the 
initial auction stage, and where reservation prices are enforced by sellers, a 
suboptimal quantity of storage is likely to be contracted. The net effect may be 
less cost-reducing investment and a loss of trust. Defining k as the degree of 
specificity of capacity, Besanko, Dranove and Shanley (1996, p. 116 and p. 132) 
show that the higher is k, the less likely are cost-reducing investments to occur, 
since the more quasi-rent is available to be negotiated away. 
Apart from problems created by the potential for collusion, different attitudes 
to risk on the part of bidders, the existence of multiple units to be auctioned, 
minimum reserve prices and participation fees are all likely to distort the 
expected returns from auctions away from the optimal value (see McAfee and 
McMillan (1987 and 1996) as well as Klemperer (1999) for discussion of these 
issues). 
Experience in the US 
In the US, auctions have been held for leases for the rights to develop gas and oil 
reserves, for pipeline capacity, for commodity trading and for disposing of costly 
gas. Lease auctions were the earliest and were designed to award private firms 
the rights to develop resources on government lands. They are sealed bid first Fiscal Studies 
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price, simultaneous auctions involving a lump sum for the rights, where the 
winner also pays royalties and rental payments as specified in the auction 
announcement (Holmes, Hyde and Rothkopf, 1998). Bids for different tracts
6 
have to be made together, including a 20 per cent deposit to deter spurious bids. 
Reserve prices and minimum bids are enforced and all information is made 
public after the winning bid is announced. The reserve price takes account of the 
likelihood that not all buyers are well informed and is often based on the 
government’s own valuation of the tract. 
More relevant to recent UK developments are the auctions for capacity 
release. Here, releasing shippers (one with firm contracts for capacity on a 
pipeline) auction capacity to other shippers (called replacement shippers). The 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) requires that all such releases 
be posted for bidding electronically with certain exceptions, but that releasing 
shippers may designate a replacement shipper to match the winning bid and 
receive the capacity. Although a first price progressive auction is used, prices are 
subject to maxima set by the FERC, and the releasing shipper may state a reserve 
price. Interstate pipeline auctions are fairly recent and are designed to avoid 
affiliate (i.e. tied company) abuse. To date, only one such auction has been 
contemplated and is currently before the Commission.
7 
Supply auctions are used to dispose of costly gas. Here, bidders have to be 
paid to take the gas, and bids proceed from highest to lowest. This ‘reverse 
auction’ approach has been used for gas supply realignment when contracts have 
been terminated under regulatory orders. Pipeline owners are allowed to recover 
the winner’s price from customers.  
The results of these auctions encouraged the FERC, in July 1998, to propose 
auctioning all short-term capacity (Holmes, Hyde and Rothkopf, 1998) and to 
discuss which type of auction may be most effective. 
IV. AUCTIONS AND STORAGE 
Prior to 1999, gas storage services in Britain were sold on the basis of three 
capacity components — space, injectability and deliverability. Space is the total 
amount of gas that the facility can hold when full, injectability is the rate at 
which gas can be put into the facility and deliverability is the rate at which gas 
can be withdrawn from the facility. For Rough and the LNG services, prices 
were published in advance. Storage offered at Hornsea was sold on a different 
basis. Part was sold by fixed prices, the remainder by an auction process. In the 
event that Hornsea was oversubscribed, it would be booked out to the highest 
                                                                                                                                    
6Tracts are typically 5,000 acres. 
7Proposal filed by the Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 
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tenderers. Successful tenderers would then receive their booking at the market-
clearing price (not the price they bid).  
The fixed prices were derived as follows. BG Storage calculated revenue 
targets for the injectability, space and deliverability service at each site and the 
targets were scaled to ensure that the total revenue was in line with specific 
targets. The revenue targets for space and injectability were added together to 
give a revenue target for space with injection rights. Targets for space with 
injection rights and deliverability were then converted into prices by dividing the 
total revenue targets by the capacity. Up until April 1971, the target revenue was 
the cost of providing the service, including a regulatory return on assets. 
Following the 1997 MMC report, BG Storage calculated the revenue target 
consistent with the new revenue cap set for transportation and storage.  
Three main concerns arise over this method of pricing for storage services. In 
the first place, at times of high demand (during the winter period), demand for 
storage services is price-inelastic and this provides an incentive to price above 
the marginal cost. BG Storage revenue did in fact exceed its maximum allocated 
revenue by 4 per cent in 1997–98, and suggested prices for 1998–99 would, if all 
capacity were booked, lead to substantial over-recovery in this year. That prices 
are too high is supported by simulation work reported by Stevens (1999). 
Second, consistently high amounts of capacity remained unbooked at Hornsea 
following the part set price, part auction process. In 1997–98, 33 per cent 
remained unbooked, while, in 1998–99, this increased to 37 per cent. 
Third, the rigid ratios in which bundles of service characteristics were sold 
limited the demand for storage. Whilst this was disadvantageous to customers, it 
was consistent with monopolistic behaviour on the part of the seller. 
Before we consider the new auction proposals, a preliminary evaluation is 
possible for the Hornsea part auctions. The auction component was a second 
price sealed bid auction for deliverability, space having already been sold at a 
fixed price. We can evaluate it on two grounds — revenue raising and efficiency. 
In terms of revenue raising, the results are significant. According to BG Storage 
in private communication with the authors, the market-clearing price and the 
revenue-maximising price were identical at 3.709p per peak day kWh per annum 
(p/pdkWh/a), indicating that the Hornsea auction did indeed raise as much as it 
could have done. However, in terms of efficiency, the result is quite different. 
Assuming that BG Storage’s guide price of 3.050p/pdkWh/a accurately reflects 
its storage costs, substantial profits were made at the auction and output was too 
low.  
The major advantages of auctioning larger amounts of storage were seen by 
Ofgas to lie in more efficient utilisation of storage, more accurate price 
discovery, reduction of risks through smaller price variation, and encouragement 
of competition. Ofgas proposed a mixture of five- and one-year auctions for both 
Rough and Hornsea storage. The form of the auction was a sequential, two-
dimensional (price and quantity), multi-attribute, second price auction in which Fiscal Studies 
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50 per cent of Rough and Hornsea capacity would be auctioned on a five-year 
basis, while the remainder would be auctioned on a one-year basis. The price 
charged is the bid of the last bidder to receive an allocation. Capacity is offered 
in bundles of attributes (injectability, space and injectability)
8 whose proportions 
are fixed in advance, in lots of 5,000 cubic feet and subject to constraints on 
market shares.
9 A five-year programme of yearly auctions, beginning in 1999–
2000, is envisaged. The auctions are open to all bidders, in contrast to the 
original Hornsea auctions, which were open only to shippers and Transco. 
Ofgas did not like reserve prices but was persuaded by BG Storage to allow 
them. Setting a reserve price would help increase expected revenue but may 
exclude some competitors and increases the risk that unsold capacity might 
remain after the auctions. To counter this eventuality, BG is obliged to offer 
unsold capacity at subsequent auctions in 2000, 2001 and 2002. Five-year unsold 
gas will be offered at subsequent one-year auctions. In practice, it may be 
difficult to distinguish reserve prices designed to encourage high bidding from 
those that seek to establish monopolistic prices. 
BG’s proposal was for the auction to be of bundled amounts of capacity, 
injectability and deliverability in the first (1999) auction, but for there to be the 
possibility of separate auctions in subsequent years. However, since bundled 
bids could be unbundled for sale in a secondary market, there seems no valid 
reason for bundling in the first place. Ofgas felt that unbundling would be 
unnecessarily complicated, but if the secondary market is capable of handling 
unbundling, why not the primary market? A secondary market calls into question 
the efficiency of the primary market — bundles are not necessarily going to be 
obtained by those who have the highest value for each service. The seller can, 
however, benefit from a secondary market through higher revenues.  
One novelty is the proposed ‘use it or lose it’ service whereby any capacity 
not being brought into use would be returned to the market. Such a service 
would, in theory, ensure full capacity utilisation. However, BG proposed 
minimum prices for ‘use it or lose it’ gas and this risks the possibility that not all 
capacity would be sold. Ofgas was unhappy about this proposal but was prepared 
to allow BG to proceed with its proposal and review it after the auction. An 
alternative approach would have been to impose some kind of penalty on BG if 
not all its capacity was used. 
The creditworthiness of bidders is important for any successful auction. If a 
winning bid were to prove unsupportable by the bidder, the auction would have 
to be held again, and the cost would be the cost of the second auction plus the 
costs of delayed decisions faced by all bidders. BG’s proposal to vet bidders at 
                                                                                                                                    
8The bundles differ between facilities. Thus, for Hornsea (Rough), bundled storage consisted of 1 (1) kWh/day 
of deliverability plus 17.948718 (66.593407) kWh of space plus 0.110769 (0.351648) kWh/day of 
injectability. Rough has a relative advantage in terms of both space and injectability. 
9In order to prevent cornering of the market, a restriction of between 15 and 20 per cent of capacity rights was 
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its discretion introduces an element of arbitrariness, which could reduce 
confidence in the auction and lower average bid levels.  
Any purchase of capacity in an auction has implications for use of related 
services, principally those involved in moving gas into and extracting it from 
storage. Fees for these services are fixed in advance. It is difficult to see any 
good reason why these services should not be included in the auction, since 
different buyers will have different requirements for services depending on the 
use they make of the storage. 
Information disclosure is incomplete. BG argued that it should be up to the 
bidders whether they wished to disclose information regarding their bids. This 
has two unfortunate effects. First, it is impossible to subject the auctions to 
rigorous scrutiny in order to evaluate their efficiency. Second, lack of full 
information creates greater uncertainty for bidders in subsequent auctions. If 
revenue raising is an objective, all information possessed by the seller should be 
published.
10 
The Rough and Hornsea auctions were held between 22 March and 22 April 
1999, and some details of the outcomes are given in Table 2. From these, we can 
make an informal evaluation of the efficiency of the auctions.  
On efficiency grounds, it would appear that the results of the 1999 auctions 
were mixed. While 100 per cent of the Hornsea capacity was sold (the sum of the 
two tranches of 50 per cent), only 52 per cent of the Rough capacity was sold, 
although this represented an improvement of 5 percentage points over the close 
of the 1998 Rough tender. Bidder interest was sustained throughout all but one  
 
TABLE 2 









Reserve price (p/kWh)  2.50  10.98  2.50  9.89 
Weighted average price (p/kWh)  5.63  11.07  5.66  9.97 
Revenue  expected  £2.5m £25.0m £2.5m £22.5m 
Revenue  achieved  £5.63m £5.55m £5.66m £18.6m 
Percentage expected to be sold  50%  50%  50%  50% 
Percentage of capacity sold  50%  11%  50%  41% 
      
Bidders, total  16  6  18  18 
Bidders, successful  10  6  9  17 
Sources: Ofgas, 1999c; BG Storage in private communication with the authors. 
                                                                                                                                    
10Alternatively, following a referee’s suggestion, forward prices in the futures market for gas could be used to 
deduce the value of gas storage and this value could be compared with results from the auction. Lack of data, 
however, precluded this type of analysis.  Fiscal Studies 
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of the auctions and ranged between six and 18 bidders. Nevertheless, although 
almost all bidders in the Rough auctions were successful, only between 50 and 
63 per cent were successful in the Hornsea auction.  
The fact that the Hornsea auction was oversubscribed while the Rough 
auction was undersubscribed suggests that the bundles of services sold were not 
optimal. Rough’s formula gave greater weight to storage space and injectability, 
while Hornsea’s formula favoured deliverability. The implication of unsatisfied 
demand for deliverability suggests that an unbundled auction would yield greater 
bidder welfare in future auctions. 
In terms of the revenue consequences of the auctions, whilst the Hornsea 
auction, if evaluated at the weighted average prices paid by successful 
applicants, yielded £11.29 million compared with £5 million reserve value 
(Ofgas, 1999a), Rough realised only £24.15 million out of its £47.5 million 
reserve value, leaving the overall sale at only 51 per cent of the reserve value. Of 
course, the final revenue total depends on the subsequent disposal of unsold 
capacity. If this were all to be sold at the weighted average price, the overall 
process would achieve a revenue for the seller 12.7 per cent greater than 
reserve.
11 Thus, at this admittedly optimistic evaluation, the revenue expectations 
of the seller would be fully protected and the auction would not appear to have 
exerted a great deal of competitive pressure on the outcome. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Using auctions represents an important new development in the regulation of the 
formerly publicly owned utilities. It offers the prospects of achieving optimal or 
near-optimal allocation of existing capacity and a price mechanism for 
establishing whether new investment is needed. Although there are varieties of 
auction design available, most of them have highly desirable properties with 
respect to the valuation of assets in rapidly changing market environments. 
Capacity can be allocated to users whose bids reveal that they place the greatest 
value on capacity, thus directly improving welfare. At the same time, auctions 
have useful revenue-raising features, as is witnessed by the popularity of 
auctions among many regulatory authorities. 
The use of auctions in connection with UK gas storage has shown that 
auctions can be successfully organised for this important component of the gas 
industry. Previously considered as essentially a joint input together with 
transportation services, the auctions held in March–April 1999 have clearly 
shown that storage can achieve higher than reserve values at auction. This 
suggests that there is a sufficient variety of competing uses for storage available 
in the independent gas sector to ensure that bidders have no difficulty in 
                                                                                                                                    
11In fact, around 83 per cent of Rough capacity was eventually sold by July 1999 (Ofgem, 2000). Details of 
revenues achieved were not published. The UK Gas Market 
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matching the incumbent’s valuation. The fact that not all of the available 
capacity was sold, however, implies that the incumbent’s valuation is too high 
for at least one of the facilities — the Rough field. This lends support to the 
argument that reserve prices should not be applied, since they can be used as 
ways of sustaining monopolistic pricing and may exclude potential buyers. 
Major improvements in the efficiency of auctions in the gas industry may be 
expected, provided certain developments occur. First is the integration of all 
aspects of storage into the auction process. Reservation of part of storage, such 
as LNG storage, for fixed price tender is likely to undermine the auction 
outcomes, so LNG should be included in future auctions. Wider adoption of 
auctions throughout the industry, as is envisaged in Ofgas (1999c), will attract 
greater bidder interest. Reserve prices should be rejected since there is no 
evidence of the development of rings, or of other forms of collusion, against 
which they might be a form of protection. The type of auction design used in any 
case minimises the potential for collusion. 
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